



Director of
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Romania: The Outlook for Ceausescu

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Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders

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SNIE 12.7-83

February 1985

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SNIE 12.7-83

ROMANIA: THE OUTLOOK FOR CEAUSESCU

Information available as of 11 February 1985 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 13 February 1985.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

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SCOPE NOTE

SNIE 12.7-83 judged that President Ceausescu's position would grow increasingly precarious over the next year as a result of the continued deterioration of economic and social conditions but also judged that Ceausescu's resources for defending his position gave him a better than even chance of surviving the next 12 months. Ceausescu has indeed maintained his hold on power, but lingering economic problems mean that disaffection within the party, the government bureaucracy, and the country remain the most serious threat to Ceausescu's reign. This Memorandum to Holders examines Ceausescu's prospects for the next two to three years. It also assesses the impact of the country's bleak economic outlook on Bucharest's ability to follow policies that sometimes run counter to Soviet objectives.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

President Ceausescu appears to be maintaining his strong grip over Romania and chances are good that he will remain in power the next two to three years at least. If he is challenged, it will probably be over the country's serious economic problems. []

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Ceausescu has preserved his already strong position by further consolidating his dominance of the party and government bureaucracy, as demonstrated by his total mastery of the party congress in November 1984. His critics are off balance due to frequent cadre rotations and the strong punitive action taken against the few who have openly disagreed with him. Close relatives and cronies remain in control of those sectors of the apparatus that are vital to protecting his position. Moreover, Ceausescu's tightened internal security controls have intimidated the population, which so far is unwilling to openly challenge the regime. []

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Despite his show of political strength, however, Ceausescu remains vulnerable on several counts. He has still not solved, and indeed is largely responsible for, Romania's serious economic problems. He has steadfastly maintained a strategy of combating Romania's financial difficulties by draconian measures that restrict imports, cut investments, and squeeze the consumer. The resulting austerity has seriously weakened the economy and could undermine its future growth potential. The economy at best will grow only slightly over the next few years. In fact, the situation of the populace appears worse in the winter of 1984-85 because of energy and food shortages and severe weather. []

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Without a common rallying point or a tradition of militancy or solidarity, the Romanian populace probably will remain incapable of united action. While the population generally is not resorting to open protests over its difficult economic plight, chances for unrest are likely to increase as economic problems multiply. Tensions within the Hungarian minority are escalating and could raise the level of discontent the authorities face. []

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The regime appears capable of keeping most protests under control, but prolonged, large-scale unrest could seriously weaken Ceausescu's grip on the bureaucracy. His problems might be aggravated by morale problems in the military and security services. If their effectiveness and reliability as Ceausescu's protector are reduced, previously cowed subordinates might be emboldened to move against him before he turns on them as scapegoats. []

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As Romania's internal problems worsen, Ceausescu may be tempted to bring Romania closer to the USSR in an effort to obtain economic help. Agreements "in principle" reportedly reached last summer to increase substantially Soviet deliveries of oil and other key raw materials in return for greater Romanian investment in the extraction of these commodities suggest Ceausescu is already moving in this direction. []

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There is reason to question the strength and durability of this trend. Negotiations on the economic agreements have bogged down on the issue of Romanian obligations, and none of the major ones appear to be final. Nor have political or military relations improved substantially. The Romanians, in fact, defied the Soviets on several occasions during 1984, including their disregard of the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic Games and Ceausescu's visit to West Germany in October. His foot-dragging in negotiating an extension of the Warsaw Pact treaty, which expires this spring, also suggests he is not prepared to improve military cooperation significantly []

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Although he may accommodate Soviet interests a bit more in order to keep alive the chances for a beneficial economic deal, Ceausescu will take care not to compromise Romania's relative independence in foreign policy. To do so would endanger his sole remaining source of domestic legitimacy and put him at the mercy of the Soviets, who neither like nor trust him. Although the Soviets would like to entice Ceausescu into more cooperative behavior, they probably are unwilling to extend substantial aid or to favor him with increasingly scarce resources without more substantial concessions than he appears prepared to give. []

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Ceausescu will also continue to pursue good relations with the West, and particularly the United States, as he needs to counterbalance Soviet pressure and influence. He may even make some slight accommodations to US interests in the foreign policy and human rights areas in the hope of securing assistance for Romania's ailing economy. His care not to overly antagonize the Soviets will inhibit significantly greater independence in foreign policy, however, and he is likely to regard US urgings to soften his internal rule as unacceptable interference in Romania's internal affairs. []

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DISCUSSION

1. SNIE 12.7-83 judged that President Ceausescu's position would grow increasingly precarious over the next year as a consequence of the continued deterioration of economic and social conditions and increased dissatisfaction throughout the party and governmental bureaucracy. It also judged, however, that Ceausescu's enormous resources for defending his position, including his near-total domination of the party and government and his control of the pervasive security apparatus, gave him a better than even chance of surviving the next 12 months. The SNIE further judged that:

- The Soviets might try to use Ceausescu's difficulties to gain more subservience from him, but would probably not use their limited economic or political leverage to try to topple Ceausescu or to force a major change in his foreign policies.
- The USSR would, however, probably feel compelled to take action, perhaps even an effort to oust Ceausescu, if the collapse of Communist rule in Romania appeared a real danger or if Ceausescu or his successors turned Romania sharply to the West and tried to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.
- US assistance and support would help Ceausescu maintain his present position vis-a-vis the Soviets, but the chances are slim that the United States could induce behavior by Ceausescu or his successors that is significantly more congenial to US interests than at present.
- A post-Ceausescu leadership would probably not make drastic changes in Romanian domestic or foreign policies, although it might explore closer relations with the USSR in the hope of getting economic help.

2. These judgments generally remain valid today. Ceausescu has survived the year without any apparent difficulty. But although he seems to have strengthened his control over the party and government and contin-

ues to stifle any opposition, the policies that he has implemented over the last year have done little to solve Romania's serious economic and social problems.

Ceausescu Maintains Control

Domestic Measures

3. Ceausescu's mastery of the Communist party congress in November 1984 confirmed that his grip on power remains strong. Careful screening of all speakers assured there would be no open criticism of Ceausescu, such as occurred at the previous congress in 1979. Ceausescu and his policies received abundant praise from all who took the podium, and all of his closest supporters were "reelected" to their current positions. His wife Elena received no new position, but she continues to maintain her role as his closest collaborator in the regime. Several relatives and cronies were promoted, including his controversial son, Nicu, and state security chief Tudor Postelnicu, who gained candidate memberships on the policymaking Political Executive Committee.

4. Ceausescu's critics within the bureaucracy have been paralyzed by his apparent invincibility and by fear of losing the perquisites of office—and possibly their freedom. The example of onetime Ceausescu-confidant and heir apparent Virgil Trofin, who—expelled from the Central Committee in 1981 reportedly for talking back to Ceausescu—died in obscurity last year, probably deters many from openly criticizing Ceausescu's leadership. Periodic "rotations of cadres" implemented again this year before and at the congress have added to the insecurity of his subordinates.

5. By continuing to tighten security controls over the populace, Ceausescu has intimidated dissenters in and out of the government. Through a pervasive informer network, the "Securitate" closely monitors worker attitudes and has been able to identify potential troublemakers and move quickly against them. Discouraged by the ease and firmness with which the regime has squelched protests against its austere and

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repressive policies over the past three to four years, the population appears resigned to substantial deprivation and preoccupied with the day-to-day task of surviving. Despite two successive harsh winters during which severe food and energy shortages brought about a further deterioration in already poor living and working conditions, popular expression of dissatisfaction mainly took the form of grumbling, increased absenteeism, and declines in worker productivity, with isolated work stoppages and demonstrations, rather than the sporadic violence that took place the previous three years. []

6. Finally, Ceausescu may have benefited from some apparent policy successes. First, Ceausescu's defiance of the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic Games last summer and his visit to West Germany last fall against Soviet wishes demonstrated that he is still capable of bold diplomatic moves that appeal to the population's nationalistic sentiments. Second, largely as a result of austerity and sharp cuts in Western imports, Romania has recorded a current account surplus for the third consecutive year and thus further reduced its hard currency debt. Although these "successes" appear to be short term, illusory, and unlikely to reap substantial and lasting material benefits for Romania, they may have created a grudging respect for Ceausescu's toughness and ability []

Foreign Policy Maneuvers

7. With serious internal problems pressing him, Ceausescu has trimmed his previous efforts to play the role of world statesman. His most important new tack in foreign policy has been to lessen political strains with the USSR in the hope of acquiring economic aid with as few "strings" as possible. []

8. In an effort to alleviate Romania's shortages of key raw materials and energy supplies, Ceausescu negotiated preliminary arrangements with the USSR last summer that, in the event they are fully carried out, could bring the two countries closer together than they have been at any time during Ceausescu's rule. []

[] the USSR agreed in principle to substantially increase sales of oil to Romania over the next several years, possibly quadrupling current exports by 1990, and to sell it on easier terms. The Soviets also reportedly agreed to increase long-term deliveries of coal, iron ore, and natural gas in return for additional Romanian investment in Soviet extraction of those commodities. []

[] Ceausescu pledged an improvement in political relations—by improving Moscow's currently very limited access to senior Romanian party cadre

and allowing more frequent party-to-party exchange visits—and an increase in military cooperation in the Warsaw Pact and bilaterally. []

9. There are indications that the warming trend between the two countries may not be all that substantial and durable. Details are yet to be worked out on most of the economic agreements, and negotiations appear bogged down on the question of Romanian contributions. None of the major agreements are yet final, as Romania seems either unwilling or unable to meet Soviet demands. The political concessions reportedly made by Ceausescu also appear ethereal. If party-to-party contacts do increase, they will certainly be under such tight restrictions and scrutiny as to prevent significant new influence by the Soviets in Romania. []

10. In addition, there is no evidence of significantly greater military cooperation—either bilaterally or within the Warsaw Pact—despite greater lipservice to that end by Ceausescu. Ceausescu continues to limit defense spending on military modernization. Indeed, Bucharest appeared to slide backward in some respects in 1984 as the result of several economy measures, including the sale to Egypt of Romania's entire fleet of homemade equivalents to Soviet T-55 tanks for hard currency and a 50-percent cut in energy for military usage. Ceausescu also shows no sign of altering Romania's prohibitions against holding joint military maneuvers on Romanian territory or participating in such maneuvers abroad except at a staff level. He reportedly has tried to amend the Warsaw Pact treaty—which expires this spring—to recognize this position. Ceausescu reportedly has also balked at Soviet proposals for a 20- to 30-year extension period. []

11. [] suggests that Ceausescu is not ready to alter the independent aspects of his foreign policy. Besides his decision to defy the Soviet-led boycott of the Olympic Games last summer and his visit to West Germany in October, Ceausescu has continued from time to time to take a line on INF at variance with that of the Soviets and, [] [] has worked in recent months with East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria to urge a more moderate stance by the Warsaw Pact in East-West relations. []

Soviet Concerns

12. The USSR's priority interest is to maintain a stable Communist regime in a Warsaw Pact country with which it shares an 830-mile border. On this score, Moscow apparently remains confident in Ceausescu's controls, despite reported concerns about the negative

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impact of some of his policies on Romania's economy and on popular attitudes. []

13. The Soviets, in addition, would like to rein in Ceausescu's independent behavior, which at times is troublesome for Soviet foreign policy. Moscow is also unhappy about his reluctance to participate fully in Warsaw Pact activities. The Soviets appear, however, to lack sufficient political leverage or influence to bring Ceausescu into line short of using—or threatening—military force. Soviet leader Chernenko's new and relatively conciliatory approach to the Romanians over the past year appears to reverse previous hard-nosed efforts by Andropov to strengthen Soviet leverage over Ceausescu. The economic agreements reached last summer have the potential—to the extent they are implemented—to increase Romania's economic dependency on the USSR. Moscow also hopes that the political agreements, depending on how they are carried out, could at least make Ceausescu less abrasive. As more optimistic goals, the Soviets probably want increased influence over Bucharest's foreign policy, better insights into the Romanian political scene, and, possibly, some "inside" leverage by co-opting assets in the leadership. []

Vulnerabilities

The Economy

14. Despite his evident political strength, Ceausescu still faces several serious problems. The most difficult—and dangerous—problem is the continued weakness of the economy. Contrary to the regime's inflated claims of a solid economic recovery last year, including a 7-percent increase in industrial production and a record grain harvest, the economy appears to have grown only slightly, if at all. Continued limitations on key industrial imports (which have rebounded little since being cut nearly in half during the 1981-82 period), have caused significant dislocations in the industrial sector. Fuel shortages, which forced widespread factory closings, delays in raw material deliveries, and disruptions in public transportation during the first three months of last year, are even more severe this winter. As a result, Bucharest announced new measures in January mobilizing the population to help increase energy production and to cut back on consumption. []

15. There were also reports that fuel shortages hampered grain harvest operations last fall. This, combined with evidence of severe weed infestations resulting from a lack of herbicides—due to import restrictions—suggests that Ceausescu's claims of a

bumper crop were exaggerated and that the harvest actually fell below average for the second consecutive year. []

16. Ceausescu's strategy—forcefully reiterated at the congress—of combating Romania's financial problems by refusing new Western loans and, instead, restricting imports from the West, cutting investment, and suppressing living standards has weakened the economy. It may even be inflicting long-term damage on the economy's infrastructure that could undermine future growth. The economy appears at best capable of only slight growth over the next several years, and its prospects could be even more bleak if there were another disastrous harvest or another extremely harsh winter. []

17. The next two or three years could be especially dangerous because a new financial squeeze is likely. The debt reschedulings of 1982 and 1983 have eased debt repayment pressures for the past three years and have allowed Romania to reduce its debt significantly (from about \$10 billion in 1981 to less than \$8 billion at the end of last year). But greater obligations during 1985-88 could bring about another crisis. Long- and medium-term obligations, for instance, rise from \$1.1 billion in 1984 to \$1.4 billion in 1985. Short of undergoing another rescheduling—something he and presumably most of Romania's major creditors would hope to avoid, Ceausescu could rescind his prohibition against new loans. []

[] Western bankers with heavy exposure in Romania probably would be willing to extend some additional credit to help the Romanians cover their debt obligations in 1985. []

18. Another option would be to tighten the screws further on the economy and try to cover current debt obligations out of the resulting hard currency earnings. Ceausescu reportedly has indicated he is ready to cut Western imports this year by up to 30 percent, if necessary. Such drastic new measures, however, would probably reduce Romania's export capability, further imperil future growth, and risk increased social unrest. []

19. While neither course is very attractive, both probably are preferable in Ceausescu's eyes to the humiliation of another rescheduling. Ceausescu may well choose a middle road—like accepting some small and hopefully inconspicuous loans while undertaking

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limited new austerity measures. This tack might help Romania avoid a financial crisis in 1985, but the same problem probably would return in 1986, and these half measures would do little to improve Romania's overall economic picture. [REDACTED]

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Social Discontent

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20. Living conditions, as a result of Ceausescu's policies, have continued to deteriorate. Food shortages worsened last winter, as local governments reportedly cut rations of basic foodstuffs and even bread became scarce in some parts of the country. Coercive measures enacted in 1984 to force private farmers to increase sales to the state did nothing to improve the very short supply of farm produce and meat throughout the year. Fuel shortages the last two winters, besides reducing supplies for home heating, caused plant closings and production bottlenecks. In turn, there were pay cuts for many Romanian workers who were unable to meet production quotas. While worker unhappiness has mainly been manifested in grumbling, increased absenteeism, and occasional antiregime leaflets and graffiti, sporadic strikes have continued into 1985. [REDACTED]

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21. A number of other economic and social measures enacted by the regime last year have provoked criticism. Parliament in June adopted Ceausescu's plan for a bizarre "scientific diet" which recommends that deprived Romanians eat fewer calories for health reasons. Another program enacted in March 1984 to increase the birth rate toughens measures to prevent abortions and forbids the sale and distribution of contraceptives. Teams of gynecologists in factories and institutes examine female workers to assure that pregnancies are not terminated. In December, a national literary journal boldly published poems critical of the regime for using coercive methods "even before birth." The responsible chief editor and the author lost their jobs. [REDACTED]

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22. Restiveness among Romania's nearly 2 million Hungarian minority appears to be on the increase. Many ethnic Hungarians believe they are victims of regime discrimination, especially in restricted employment and the lack of opportunities for education in their mother tongue. They chafe at the growing disparity between their lot and the comparatively good situation of their conationals in Hungary. Concern about antiregime sentiment in the Hungarian community escalated following a powerful explosion last June in a heavily ethnic-Hungarian city in Transylvania, which authorities suspect was set off by Hungarian nationalists. [REDACTED]

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Political Disaffection

23. Widespread criticism within the lower and middle regime bureaucracy continues. Ceausescu's handling of the economy, particularly his refusal to alter his industrialization strategy or reduce central control, is the main target. At the party congress last November, Ceausescu defended his policy of heavy state involvement in economic management and criticized "all sorts of theories" favoring decentralization. [REDACTED]

economic reformists in Romania contends that market-oriented reforms are imperative to prevent further economic decline. [REDACTED]

24. Dissatisfaction over Ceausescu's autocratic and personalized ruling style was probably exacerbated by the intensification of his personality cult and promotion of several relatives—especially his playboy son—at the party congress in November. [REDACTED]

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25. We believe that Ceausescu is concerned about the possibility of trouble in the ranks of the military-security apparatus. A broad reshuffle of provincial security chiefs and army field commanders last fall ostensibly was to bring new blood into the upper ranks of these services. It also may have reflected concern about their loyalty. [REDACTED]

Earlier in 1984 Ceausescu appeared to have quieted grumbling in the military with pay raises, promotions, and enhanced status, and he has always pampered the security forces. It is possible that the new personnel shifts—especially in the security apparatus—reflect Ceausescu's irritation over the inability to stop continuing low-level criticism of his rule and antiregime activity by ethnic Hungarian nationalists. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

26. Ceausescu's firm control of the apparatus and ruthlessness in suppressing dissent probably will enable him to maintain his political dominance over at least the next two to three years, which is the time frame of this Estimate. But his tactic of increasing repressive measures may not override discontent due to economic problems. []

27. He appears to have little to fear from his cowed and insecure subordinates. A master at behind-the-scene maneuvering, Ceausescu has acquired enormous personal power over decisionmaking and has rendered the party and government apparatus incapable of independent action. Family members or cronies who control every sector vital to maintaining his control—cadre selection, the military, the security forces—will see his word as law. His frequent infusions of new blood into party and government ranks through periodic cadre rotations will keep potential rivals off balance and assure the loyalty of the newcomers, who owe their enhanced status and authority to him. To this end, Ceausescu replaced nearly one-half of the Central Committee at the party congress, reportedly including a large portion of the "old guard," so his grip on the party elite should continue strong for some time to come. []

28. Ceausescu probably will stick to his tactics of defusing popular discontent by occasionally channeling scarce resources to relieve the most volatile tensions, forcefully suppressing overt protests whenever they occur, and maintaining tight controls over the populace. Without a common rallying point or a tradition of militancy or solidarity, the population probably will remain incapable of united action and demoralized by the seeming futility of challenging the regime. Even so, Ceausescu's program could be tested over the next few months, though we expect him to come through the experience much as he has in the past three years. []

29. This year will be very difficult for most Romanians. Food supplies remain short and could even decline in the event of another mediocre grain harvest and continued regime efforts to maximize food exports to earn hard currency. Energy shortages, too, are likely to continue as a result of the especially severe winter and continued emphasis on exports of oil products. []

30. In the area of foreign relations, we believe Ceausescu will continue to be somewhat more accommodating to Soviet interests as long as negotiations on potentially beneficial economic deals are taking place. []

31. Despite his more accommodating stance, however, Ceausescu will take care not to compromise Romania's relative independence. To do so would forfeit his sole remaining source of domestic legitimacy and put him at the mercy of Moscow, which has little reason to like or trust him. Ceausescu, therefore, will continue to resist Soviet efforts to integrate Romania more fully into the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and will try to strengthen ties with the West, the Third World, and China as a buffer against Soviet pressure. []

32. The Soviets, moreover, probably will not go very far in their courtship of Ceausescu. Hard pressed by their own economic problems, they would prefer not to expend substantial resources to try to wring greater obedience from Ceausescu, who appears unlikely to give them what they want and whose troublesome behavior in any case has never directly threatened their vital security interests. To give significant aid to Ceausescu at this time, moreover, could cause problems with the USSR's more strategically important East European allies, who have had to accept reductions in Soviet subsidies in recent years. []

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33. Ceausescu will continue to value good relations with the West, and particularly the United States, as a source of both prestige and support for his independent-minded foreign policy. Worsening economic problems at home could incline him from time to time to try to accommodate US interests in the foreign policy and human rights areas in the hope of obtaining assistance. Ceausescu's willingness and ability to pursue a foreign policy line more compatible with US interests, however, will remain greatly limited by his concern not to exceed what he perceives as the limits of Soviet tolerance, and he will continue to reject most US urgings to moderate his repressive internal policies as unacceptable interference in Romania's internal affairs. [redacted]

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The Threat to Ceausescu

34. We are unable to predict with confidence how much more deprivation would lead the populace to react violently. Despite lowered expectations and successful regime intimidation, there presumably is a low point that will induce the people to act against a government that fails to provide basic needs. This saturation point is not likely soon unless there is a sudden worsening of living conditions. Similarly, serious ethnic unrest could make grievances over the deteriorating economic situation harder to suppress. [redacted]

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35. Although the regime seems likely to control social unrest, any prolonged, large-scale protests could gradually weaken Ceausescu's grip on the party and government bureaucracy. Morale problems in the military-security apparatus could be aggravated, thus blunting its effectiveness and lowering its reliability as the main prop of Ceausescu's authority. Ceausescu's aura of invincibility could weaken, and previously cowed subordinates might be encouraged to move against him—especially if they fear being sacrificed as scapegoats. [redacted]

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[redacted] neither Mrs. Ceausescu nor her son, Nicu, would be able to succeed Ceausescu other than on an interim basis. Although they have a number of allies in the top leadership, their power is essentially derivative and they are widely disliked. A post-Ceausescu leadership would probably be collective in nature for at least a few years, as no one but Ceausescu appears to have sufficient stature to stand alone. Individuals from Ceausescu's inner circle would probably dominate such a leadership. Bobu, Postelnicu, Dascalescu, and First Deputy Prime Minister Gheorghe Oprescu especially stand out as likely to play a major role. [redacted]

38. We believe that a post-Ceausescu leadership would not stray far from the essence of current Ceausescu policies. Ceausescu's top subordinates appear to believe in at least the major thrust of his hardline domestic strategy and his independent-minded foreign policy and probably would consider any sudden, major changes as potentially destabilizing. They might step back somewhat from Ceausescu's more onerous internal policies in an effort to gain the population's confidence, however, and might pursue a marginally less troublesome role in Warsaw Pact councils. [redacted]

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Possible Indicators of Problems for Ceausescu

39. [redacted]

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[redacted] Such a move, nonetheless, probably would be made only after considerable pressure had built up against him, possibly over a period of several months to a year. The following indicators could provide an early warning that Ceausescu is encountering problems of such magnitude that they could

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endanger his position and/or his relatively independent foreign policy:

- *Increased defensiveness in Ceausescu's policy statements*, which could reflect growing criticism and debate within the leadership.
- *Greater visibility by Ceausescu's subordinates*, which would be highly unusual given the usual media focus on Ceausescu and his family, and could reflect Ceausescu's desire to spread the blame for unpopular decisions or signal a weakening of his position in the leadership.
- *Ceausescu's withdrawal from foreign activity or from public view*, which would be out of character and might signal growing preoccupation with internal problems.
- *Significantly heightened security or an increased Securitate role in the regime*, which could indicate concern about social unrest or about a potential challenge to Ceausescu from within the leadership.
- *Sharp cuts in rations of food, energy supplies, and other consumer goods*.
- *Increasing rapidity, scope, and severity of personnel changes*, which could indicate an effort to find scapegoats in order to assuage public discontent or concern about possible conspiracies. Such actions could actually prompt a challenge to Ceausescu by subordinates fearful of losing their own positions.

- *A significant increase in cooperation with the USSR or with the United States*, which could reflect a leadership struggle or Ceausescu's belief that internal problems had worsened to the point that there was no other way to save his regime.
- *Widening social protests*, especially by miners, who touched off the rash of protests of 1980-81, or by the Hungarian minority.
- *Evidence of serious discontent within the military and/or security forces*, which are the main props of Ceausescu's power.
- *The demotion and/or criticism of Ceausescu's highly placed relatives, especially his wife*, which would indicate he was losing control of the political process.
- *Increased Soviet warnings or threats directed against Ceausescu*, which could presage a major hardening of Soviet policy toward Romania, possibly to include an effort to topple him.

40. The appearance of these indicators would not necessarily imply that Ceausescu was on his way out or that Romania was about to come under Moscow's thumb. It would, however, especially if several appeared in a relatively short span of time, signal that Ceausescu was experiencing unusual difficulty and should alert the Intelligence Community to the need for a heightened analytical and collection posture.

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